In BASF v. Township of Toms River, No. 002155-2011 (N.J. Tax Court Dec. 5, 2013), the Court was asked to decide, in advance of trial, the proper methodology for determining the assessed value of a large tract of land that had been designated as a Superfund Site, but which contained large portions of uncontaminated and developable land.  While the Township sought to discount the value of only the polluted areas of the property, the owner contended that the pollution discount must be applied to the entire parcel.  And that is exactly how the Court saw it. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Administrative Appeals, CERCLA, Cleanup, Contamination, New Jersey, Real Estate, Remediation, Superfund, Taxes

Determining the appropriate Statute of Limitations for claims brought pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 9601, et seq. (“CERCLA”), is often a tricky matter.  Usually, the issue arises in the context of determining whether a claim is properly brought under Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), for costs voluntarily incurred, or § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), for costs incurred pursuant to a court order or approved settlement, as Section 107(a) claims may be subject to a six-year statute of limitations, while claims under Section 113(f) have a three-year limitations period.  However, in State of New York v. Next Millenium Realty, LLC, No. 12-2894-cv (2^nd Cir. Oct. 15, 2013), the Second Circuit turned its attention to a different distinction, the one between removal actions and remedial actions, as Section 107(a) claims “must be commenced … for a removal action, within 3 years after completion of the removal action [and] for a remedial action, within 6 years after initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action. . . .”  42 U.S.C. Section 9613(g)(2)(B).  In order to find the claims of the State of New York timely, the Court held that a water purification system in use for over 15 years was nevertheless a removal action and not a remedial action because, among other things, the measures were intended to “minimize and mitigate” damage from contamination and not to “permanently eliminate” it.  Id. at 24. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: CERCLA, Cleanup, Contamination, Cost Recovery, New Jersey, Procedure, Remediation, Removal, Second Circuit, Statute of Limitations, Superfund

Under Section 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA, a party who has arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at a facility may, like other categories of Potentially Responsible Parties, be strictly liable for response costs.  Where the PRP has engaged in the sale of a “useful product,” even one known to be hazardous, is not liable as an arranger unless the PRP has taken “intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.”   Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S., 556 U.S. 599, 609-10 (2009)(“BNSF”).  Mere knowledge that there might be a discharge of hazardous substances in connection with the transport or use of the product is not sufficient to impose arranger liability.  Id. at 611.  As a result, “whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive inquiry that looks beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction . . . and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was on Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s strict-liability provisions.  Id. at 610.  Just such a “fact-intensive inquiry” was undertaken by the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan last week in Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corp., Case No. 1:11-CV-483 (W.D.MI. Sept. 26, 2013), one of a number of cases dealing with the recycling of “broke,” or scraps of carbonless copy paper coated with a PCB-containing emulsion produced by NCR from the mid-1950’s until 1971.  Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: CERCLA, Cleanup, Contamination, Contribution, Cost Recovery, Waste, Water

For decades, it has been the unanswered question – what is the statute of limitations for a claim under New Jersey’s Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11, et. seq. (the “Spill Act”)?  Unlike CERCLA, the Spill Act contains no express statute of limitations for private contribution actions.  Thus, trial courts have been left to fend for themselves and, as a result, have failed to achieve consensus.  Federal district courts have unanimously applied New Jersey’s six year limitations period for actions for damages to real property, while, until Friday, the only state decision was an unpublished trial court opinion holding that there is no limitations period for such claims.  But on August 23, 2013, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, in the case of Morristown Assoc. v. Grant Oil Co., No. A-0313-11T3 (App. Div. Aug. 23, 2013), finally spoke and, in agreement with the federal courts, held that the six-year limitations period applies. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Cleanup, Contamination, Contribution, Cost Recovery, Decisions of Note, New Jersey, Private Right of Action, Remediation, Spill Act, Statute of Limitations, Statute of Repose, Tolling

As footnoted in yesterday’s post, the decision in Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., No. 12-2059 (3^rd Cir. Aug. 20, 2013), was a twofer.  Yesterday, we wrote about that part of the decision which held that a party who has resolved its liability under state statutes may seek contribution under Section 113(f) of CERCLA.  Today, we look at the second part of the decision, which concerns the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §6901, et seq.  Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Cleanup, Consent Decree, Contamination, Pennsylvania, Private Right of Action, RCRA, Remediation, Removal, Third Circuit, Waste

The Third Circuit keeps rolling out environmental decisions this month, and while Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, No. 12-4216 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013), received the lion’s share of press this week (including here), another decision issued the same day, Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., No. 12-2059 (3^rd Cir. Aug. 20, 2013), is also worth reading.  In it, the Third Circuit holds that a party who has resolved its liability to the state for remediation under state law may pursue contribution under CERCLA, which puts the Third Circuit in conflict with the Second Circuit on this issue. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: CERCLA, Cleanup, Contamination, Contribution, Cost Recovery, Pennsylvania, Remediation, Superfund, Third Circuit

In May, we reported on the case of Strudley v. Antero Resources Corp., No. 2011 CV 2218 (Denver Co. Dist. Court  May 9, 2012), in which a state trial court issued a Lone Pine order requiring the plaintiffs to show, prior to the initiation of discovery, that there was a prima facie basis for associating their personal injury claims with the defendants’ hydraulic fracturing activities.  The court subsequently dismissed the case when the plaintiffs failed, in the court's view, to meet this initial burden.  The dismissal was appealed and in Strudley v. Antero Resources Corp., Court of Appeals No. 12CA1251 (Co. Ct. Appeals, 1st Div., July 3, 2013), reversed.   Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Case Update, Causation, Contamination, Discovery, Drilling, Due Process, Marcellus Shale, Natural Gas, Oil and Gas, Procedure, Real Estate, Toxic Torts

As most of our readers know, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)gives the EPA control over  the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste, often described as “cradle-to-grave” coverage of hazardous wastes.  One of its provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), allows any person to bring suit against another “who has contributed . . . to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Citizen Suit, Contamination, Cost Recovery, RCRA, Waste

In July, 2001, the New Jersey Superior Court decided the case of White Oak Funding, Inc. v. Winning, 341 N.J. Super. 294 (App.Div.), cert. denied. 170 N.J. 209 (2001), holding that an owner of contaminated property purchased before September 14, 1993, was not liable for historic contamination that the owner did not contribute to.  Only a week later, amendments to New Jersey’s Industrial Site Recovery Act (“ISRA”) became effective.  Among other things, those amendments provided that owners who acquired property prior to September 14, 1993 would not be liable for clean-up costs if “at the time of acquisition, [the purchaser undertook] all appropriate inquiry on the previous ownership and uses of the property based upon generally accepted good and customary standards.”  N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(d)(5).  So, did this amendment abrogate the holding in White Oak?   A decade later, on October 29, 2012, the New Jersey Superior Court has said that it did. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Cleanup, Condemnation, Contamination, Cost Recovery, Eminent Domain, ISRA, New Jersey, Real Estate, Spill Act, Takings

A few months ago, we reported on an interesting Seventh Circuit opinion on CERCLA §107 claims issued in the Fox River clean-up litigation in Wisconsin.  The Fox River clean-up, and the ensuing private party litigation, represents one of a number cases that have arisen from EPA’s efforts to remediate water bodies throughout the country that have been declared to be Superfund sites—including the Lower Passaic River and Newark Bay in northern New Jersey, the Hudson River in upstate New York, and the Gowanus Canal in Brooklyn.  Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Case Update, Cases to Watch, CERCLA, Cleanup, Contamination, Cost Recovery, Decisions of Note, Remediation, Superfund