In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 244 S.Ct. 2244 (2024), the general breadth and scope of agency decision-making has been called into question. In its recent decision, Huntsman Petrochemical LLC v. EPA, No. 23-1045, 2024 WL 3763355 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2024), the D.C. Circuit has made it clear that where statutory interpretation is not implicated, the Court will continue to afford EPA’s conclusions involving technical expertise a significant degree of deference. While neither the parties nor the Court attempted to address or reference Loper Bright, the Court articulated a clear standard applicable to agency actions involving statistical and modeling analyses: the Court will examine each step of an agency’s analysis to satisfy themselves that the agency has not “departed from a rational course.” Only where a statistical model “bears no rational relationship to the characteristics of data to which it was applied” will agency action be deemed arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, regulated entities should be aware that the concept of deference lives on when challenging agency decision-making, even in the wake of the fall of Chevron Deference. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Air, Chevron Deference, Clean Air Act, D.C. Circuit, Emissions, EPA, HAPs, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Rulemaking

On September 14, 2023, in Conservation Law Foundation v. Academy Bus, a Massachusetts District Court held that the members of the Conservation Law Foundation (the “Foundation”) lacked standing to challenge the idling of buses under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).  Conservation Law Found. v. Acad. Express, LLC., No. 20-10032-WGY, 2023 WL 5984517, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 14, 2023). Specifically, the court held that simply breathing in polluted air, without any concrete injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant, is not sufficient to prove an actual injury under the CAA. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Air, Citizens Suit, Clean Air Act, Emissions, HAPs, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Odors, Standing

This post was authored by Trang Do, a summer associate.

In West Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court limited the authority of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reduce greenhouse gases by setting emission guidelines for existing power plants, characterizing the energy generation shifting strategy proposed in the Clean Power Plan (CPP) as an overreach of the agency’s power. In a 6-3 decision, with the three liberal justices dissenting, the Court held that the authority to adopt a regulatory program that would significantly alter how the nation’s energy is generated fell under an “extraordinary case” of the major questions doctrine. West Virginia v. EPA 597 U. S. ____ (2022). The major questions doctrine requires that a federal agency have “clear congressional authorization” when acting on issues of great “economic and political significance.” Id. (citing Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324). Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Clean Air Act, Climate Change, Decisions of Note, Electric, Emissions, Energy, EPA, Greenhouse Gas, Legislation, Refinery, Rulemaking, Supreme Court, West Virginia

This Blog Post was authored by Brielle Brown, a summer associate.  Originally published on July 7, 2021, it has been updated to reflect that after a rehearing, the decision was affirmed on July 20, 2021.

A three-judge panel of the Third Circuit held on June 21, 2021, that air emission exceedances governed by a state air permit and duly reported to state or local authorities pursuant to the permit need not be reported again to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) pursuant to the Section 103 reporting requirements of the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2 F.4^th 112 (3d Cir. 2021); 42 U.S.C. § 9603. The decision was reheard and affirmed on July 20, 2021. Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 20-2215, -- F.4^th --, 2021 WL 3045927 (3d Cir., July 20, 2021). The court’s reasoning came down to an interpretation of CERCLA that the phrase “subject to” was intended to mean “governed or affected by” rather than “obedient to.” Id. at *3–4. Thus, air emissions that violate relevant Clean Air Act permits are nevertheless “subject to” that permit and therefore exempt from CERCLA’s reporting requirement. Id. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Air, CERCLA, Chevron Deference, Clean Air Act, Emissions, Pennsylvania, Permits, Superfund, Third Circuit

Last week, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan refused to void a private settlement agreement entered between Sierra Club and DTE in the face of an objection by the United States that the settlement agreement interfered with a related consent decree and infringed on the government’s enforcement authority. United States v. DTE Energy Co., et al., No. 10-CV-13101 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2020). Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Citizen Suit, Clean Air Act, Consent Decree, Emissions, Energy, Enforcement, Enforcement Action, Michigan

This Post was authored by Andrew LeDonne, a MGKF summer associate. 

On July 2, 2018, the State of Rhode Island (“RI”) filed suit against twenty-one oil and gas companies in an attempt to hold these organizations liable for climate change impacts RI has and will experience. The defendants (Chevron Corp., et al.) removed the case to federal court. On August 17, 2018, RI filed a motion to remand the case back to state court. On Monday, July 22, 2019, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted RI’s motion to remand. The remand order was stayed for sixty days for the court to consider whether a further stay pending appeal is warranted. Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 2019 WL 3282007 (D.R.I. July 22, 2019). Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Air, Clean Air Act, Climate Change, Emissions, Federal Procedure, First Circuit, Nuisance, Oil and Gas, Preemption, Procedure, Subject Matter Jurisdiction

UPDATE: 

This past Thursday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit delayed for two weeks its mandate which required the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to lift its 90-day stay on portions of its methane rule for new oil and gas infrastructure.  The Court issued the mandate after determining that the EPA lacked authority under the Clean Air Act to issue the stay on the Obama-era regulations as further discussed in the original blog post below.  The order delaying the mandate indicates that the Court is providing EPA with time to “determine whether to seek panel rehearing, rehearing en banc, or pursue other relief” with respect to the mandate.  Thus, the methane rule is again on hold for the next several weeks while EPA decides whether and how to challenge the Court’s lifting of the 90-day stay.     

ORIGINAL POST:

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck down a 90-day stay imposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency on portions of its methane rule for new oil and gas infrastructure, finding the agency lacked authority under the Clean Air Act to issue the stay. Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, No. 17-1145 (D.C. Cir. July 3, 2017).  The methane rule, which establishes “New Source Performance Standards” for fugitive emissions of methane and other pollutants by the oil and natural gas industries, was finalized in June 2016 by the Obama administration.  Notably, the Court’s 2-1 decision puts back into effect the June 3, 2017 deadline for regulated entities to conduct an initial monitoring survey to identify leaks from equipment. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Air, Clean Air Act, D.C. Circuit, Emissions, EPA, Procedure, Rulemaking

In the recent decision of Cole v. Marathon Oil Corporation, Case No. 16-10642 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 2016), a district court in the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed, in its entirety, a putative class action lawsuit against a refinery operated by the Marathon Oil Corporation (“Marathon”).  The court dismissed two of the complaint’s three common law claims as time-barred under Michigan law because the complaint failed to plead a “plausible” basis for the court to infer that the claims accrued within the limitations period, and the third cause of action, strict liability, was dismissed on the ground that it is not an independently-recognized cause of action in Michigan.  The decision suggests that, at least under Michigan law, plaintiffs in tort cases must allege more than mere ongoing harm when the allegations on the face of the complaint do not anticipate and provide a plausible basis to avoid an obvious, although unstated, statute of limitations problem. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Air, Class Actions, Emissions, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Medical Monitoring, Michigan, Negligence, Nuisance, Statute of Limitations, Tolling, Toxic Torts

Last week, a federal court in the Central District of Illinois held the owner and operator of a coal-fired power plant liable for violations of the Clean Air Act for exceeding particulate matter emission thresholds in the plant’s state operating permit.  NRDC v. Ill. Power Res., LLC, No. 13-cv-1181, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111976 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016).  The court found that the plaintiffs—three environmental advocacy organizations who filed suit under the citizen suit provision of the CAA—had standing to sue the plant because certain of their individual members suffered injury-in-fact where emitted pollutants that “could cause harm” were present in the witnesses’ general geographic area and the witnesses’ pleasure was somehow diminished by the presence of the pollutants, even where the witnesses could not point to an objective effect of the alleged violation. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Citizen Suit, Clean Air Act, Emissions, Federal Procedure, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Illinois, Permits, Standing

Several years ago we reported on Community Action & Environmental Justice v. Union Pacific Corporation, in which a California District Court held the dispersion into the air of particulate matter that reaches the ground or water did not constitute a “disposal” subject to RCRA but, instead, was subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act.  That District Court opinion was affirmed in 2014, in Community Action & Environmental Justice v. Union Pacific Corporation, 764 F.3d 1019 (9^th Cir. 2014).  Yesterday, in the case of Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, No. 15-35228 (9^th Cir. July 27, 2016), the Ninth Circuit expanded this analysis of the relative roles of our environmental laws by holding that a party who disperses air pollutants that eventually settle into the ground or water are not arrangers liable under CERCLA as they have not “disposed of” hazardous substances under the Act. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Air, Arranger Liability, Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser, California, CERCLA, Clean Air Act, Contamination, Decisions of Note, Emissions, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Ninth Circuit, RCRA, Superfund