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Showing 65 posts in Real Estate.

Back in August of 2013, we reported that the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, in the case of Morristown Associates v. Grant Oil Co., held that a six year statute of limitations applied to claims brought pursuant to the Spill Act.  On Tuesday, January 27, 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned that decision to find that there is no statute of limitations barring a Spill Act claim.  MGKF will shortly be issuing a Special Alert discussing this important decision in more detail.

In November 2009, a group of 44 plaintiffs, including the Ely family, filed suit against Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. for personal injuries and property damages that allegedly resulted from Cabot’s hydraulic fracturing operations in Dimock Township, Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania. The case is pending in the Middle District of Pennslyvania, captioned as Ely et al. v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., et al., Dkt. No. 3:09-cv-2284 (M.D. Pa.) (J. Carlson). After a number of parties settled out of the lawsuit, Cabot filed a motion for summary judgment on the Elys’ claims for breach of contract and lost royalties on an oil and gas lease, fraudulent inducement, negligence and negligence per se, medical monitoring, and violations of the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (“HSCA”).   On Monday, nearly all of the Elys’ claims were dismissed. Read More »

In a 7-2 opinion issued today, the United States Supreme Court held that CERCLA does not preempt state law statutes of repose that foreclose causes of action for personal injury and property damage claims asserted after a statutorily-prescribed time period has elapsed, effectively absolving potential defendants from liability.

The case – CTS Corp. v. Waldburger et al, 573 U.S. ___ (2014) (slip op) – involves a 2011 state-law nuisance action against the former property owner, CTS Corp., which in 1987 sold property contaminated with TCE and DCE, which it had characterized as “environmentally sound.”  More than 20 years after CTS Corp. sold the property, EPA informed subsequent property owners and adjacent landowners that their groundwater was contaminated and that the source of the contamination was the former electronics manufacturing facility operated by CTS Corp. on the property. Read More »

Landowners who find themselves in the path of an oil or gas pipeline quickly learn that their rights are limited, and that a pipeline company granted a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity hold most of the cards.  Thus, the recent decision in Alliance Pipeline, L.P. v. 4,360 Acres of Land, No. 13-1003 (8th Cir. Mar. 24, 2014), which in a mere 10 pages washed aside the landowners challenges Alliance Pipeline’s condemnation action, comes as no surprise.    Read More »

Since the United States Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2451 (2011), plaintiffs in contamination cases have struggled to meet the raised bar for class certification.  And that bar was certainly not lowered by the Seventh Circuit in its decision in Parko v. Shell Oil Co., Nos. 13-8023 & 13-8024 (7th Cir. Jan 17, 2014).  Parko involved a putative class comprised of property owners in the town of Roxana, Illinois, who claimed that their property values had been diminished by benzene contamination of the groundwater from an adjacent oil refinery which had been in operation for nearly 100 years.  In checking off the certification requirements, the district court held that the question of whether the multiple defendants who owned and operated the refinery during the preceding 90 plus years failed to “contain petroleum byproduct [resulting] in contamination to Roxana property” predominated.   The Seventh Circuit panel unanimously disagreed.  Judge Posner, writing for the Court, described the opinion as necessary for clarification of a trial court’s responsibility to conduct a “rigorous analysis” of whether common issues predominate; in doing so, he did not hesitate to take the district judge to task for “treat[ing] predominance as a pleading requirement” rather than an evidentiary one.  Read More »

In BASF v. Township of Toms River, No. 002155-2011 (N.J. Tax Court Dec. 5, 2013), the Court was asked to decide, in advance of trial, the proper methodology for determining the assessed value of a large tract of land that had been designated as a Superfund Site, but which contained large portions of uncontaminated and developable land.  While the Township sought to discount the value of only the polluted areas of the property, the owner contended that the pollution discount must be applied to the entire parcel.  And that is exactly how the Court saw it. Read More »

In a precedential decision issued by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Vodenichar v. Halcon Energy Properties, Inc., No. 13-2812 (Aug. 16, 2013), the Court addressed the two exceptions to the Class Action Fairness Act that permits remand to state courts of class action complaints over which the federal courts would otherwise have jurisdiction.  First, the Court provided guidance as to the interpretation of the term “primary defendants” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) and, second, held that the “other class action” language of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A) was not intended to encompass prior actions between the same parties where the procedural history indicates that the second suit was merely a continuation of the prior suit. Read More »

In May, we reported on the case of Strudley v. Antero Resources Corp., No. 2011 CV 2218 (Denver Co. Dist. Court  May 9, 2012), in which a state trial court issued a Lone Pine order requiring the plaintiffs to show, prior to the initiation of discovery, that there was a prima facie basis for associating their personal injury claims with the defendants’ hydraulic fracturing activities.  The court subsequently dismissed the case when the plaintiffs failed, in the court's view, to meet this initial burden.  The dismissal was appealed and in Strudley v. Antero Resources Corp., Court of Appeals No. 12CA1251 (Co. Ct. Appeals, 1st Div., July 3, 2013), reversed.   Read More »

In September of 2011, we first posted about the case of Butler v. Estate of Powers in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a Pennsylvania trial court decision holding that, under long-standing precedent, any grant of mineral rights that did not expressly include natural gas similarly did not include shale gas.  The Superior Court disagreed, relying on United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983)(Hoge II) which held that the party with the rights to coal also had rights to the coalbed gas contained in the coal.  Instead, the Superior Court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on, in essence, whether shale gas is similar to coalbed gas and should be treated that way.  At the time we first discussed theButler case, we concluded: Read More »

Relying on the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure, yesterday the New Jersey Supreme Court , inNJDEP v. Huber, ___ N.J. ____ (Apr. 4, 2013), held that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) does not have an unfettered right to inspect residential property in order to ensure compliance or determine violations of the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act, even when the property in question is subject to an FWPA permit. Read More »