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Showing 38 posts in Statute of Limitations.

On September 27, 2024, in Short Creek Development, LLC v. MFA Incorporated, No. 22-05021-CV-SW-WBG, 2024 WL 4326815 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 2024), Magistrate Judge W. Brian Gaddy determined Plaintiffs’ claim under Section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) was barred by the applicable statute of limitations as “physical on-site construction of the remedial action” occurred more than six years prior to when Plaintiffs brought their lawsuit.  Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that costs related to a leachate collection system constructed approximately a year before the adoption of a Record of Decision (“ROD”) amendment outlining a permanent remedy for the Orongo-Duenweg Mining Belt Superfund Site (the “Site”) was the beginning of the six-year limitations period.   In doing so, the Court rejected adoption of a “bright-line” rule that remedial actions begun before adoption of a final remedial plan do not trigger the limitations period.  Read More »

In a recent case from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the court granted a partial motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s common law claims because they were deemed time-barred under Pennsylvania law.  Iorfido v. Domtar Paper Company, LLC et al., No. 23-156, 2024 WL 1346641 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2024).  The lawsuit stemmed from a paper mill’s ongoing emissions of lime particulate matter that allegedly harmed plaintiff’s property.  The court dismissed the common law claims as obviously barred by the two-year statute of limitations as pled in plaintiff’s complaint. Read More »

Stanford University can proceed with its lawsuit against HP Inc. and Agilent Technologies, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California ruled on September 19, 2022, holding that because certain soil contamination was a “continuous” or abatable nuisance or trespass, Stanford’s nuisance and trespass claims were not time barred and could continue.  Accordingly, the court denied HP and Agilent’s motion for summary judgment on Stanford’s nuisance and trespass claims. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., No. 18-cv-01199 (N.D. Ca. Sept. 19, 2022). Read More »

In Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corporation, the Sixth Circuit confronted a novel question concerning CERCLA’s statutes of limitations: whether a bare declaratory judgment on liability triggers the Section 113(g)(3) three-year limitations period for a contribution claim brought under Section 113(f)(1). The first circuit court to address this issue, the Court answered in the affirmative. Read More »

On Wednesday, August 18, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a district court order dismissing claims for violations of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. See Revitalizing Auto Cmtys. Envtl. Response Tr. v. Nat'l Grid USA, No. 20-1931-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2021). The Court held that the claims, which were brought under sections 107 and 113 of CERCLA, were prudentially ripe because they were based on costs plaintiffs had already incurred for which they might not receive repayment through EPA investigation. Id. Read More »

Less than a month after hearing oral arguments, the United States Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Guam v. United States, Docket No. 20-382 (May 24, 2021), the eagerly anticipated opinion on whether consent decrees and administrative orders that do not expressly resolve liability for claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) nevertheless give rise to a claim for contribution under Section 113(f)(3) of CERCLA. The issue is a crucial one and has been the subject of numerous court opinions because of the short, three-year limitations period for contribution actions. The opinion, which the Court intended to provide clarity in the area, holds that only settlements that release “CERCLA-specific liability” trigger the right to contribution. Read More »

On March 1, 2021, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio issued a ruling denying in part the summary judgment motion of Defendants Ingersoll-Rand and Trane U.S., against whom Plaintiff FIP Realty Co. brought various claims related to the historic release of VOCs on a site now owned by Plaintiff. See Fip Realty Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Plc, No. 2:19-cv-03291. After acquiring the site out of receivership in 2010, Plaintiff retained several environmental consulting firms and undertook voluntary remediation efforts pursuant to the Ohio Voluntary Action Program (VAP). Six years later Plaintiff submitted a No Further Action (NFA) letter to the Ohio EPA, which in turn issued a Final Order and Covenant releasing Plaintiff from liability at the site as a result of its successful remediation. In 2019 Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit seeking to recover remediation costs under CERCLA Sections 107(a) and 113(f)(3)(B), and to obtain a declaratory judgment under Section 113(g)(2) that Defendants are liable for all future costs. Defendants moved for summary judgment on various issues, two of which are the subject of disagreement among the federal appellate courts. Read More »

Earlier this week the Eleventh Circuit issued a published decision in Pinares v. United Technology Corporation, No. 18-15104, slip op. (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2020), affirming the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Pratt & Whitney, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred. In doing so, the Court held that the personal injury tolling provision in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) does not apply to public liability actions brought pursuant to the Price-Anderson Act (“PAA”) or to claims styled under state law based on injuries from radiation exposure. Thus, the lawsuit pursued by Joselyn and Steve Santiago alleging that Pratt & Whitney was liable for their deceased daughter Cynthia Santiago’s cancer was time barred. Read More »

On August 10, 2020, the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court’s grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgement, permitting plaintiffs’ case to move forward in a Superfund action for contribution. See Arconic v. APC Investment, No. 19-55181 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2020), a case we had reported on here. At issue was whether a settlement between plaintiffs and certain de minimis parties for future potential response costs was an adequate triggering event for the statute of limitations period (against different defendants) in an action for contribution under CERCLA Section 113(f). The Ninth Circuit held that it was not, explaining that in the context of a “judicially approved settlement,” the proper triggering event was a settlement which imposed actual cleanup costs in excess of a party’s estimated liability at the site. Read More »

In late July 2020, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss in a case involving releases of uranium radiation and other non-radioactive waste onto plaintiffs’ property. See Op. and Order, McGlone v. Centrus Energy Corp., et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-02196 (S.D. Ohio, July 31, 2020). Claims involving the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and the Price-Anderson Act and were dismissed for failing to state a claim, while most state law tort claims for releases of non-radioactive waste were permitted to move forward, the court clarifying that medical monitoring exists as a form of damages under Ohio law and not as a separate claim. Read More »