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Showing 27 posts in Waste.
On September 27, 2024, in Short Creek Development, LLC v. MFA Incorporated, No. 22-05021-CV-SW-WBG, 2024 WL 4326815 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 2024), Magistrate Judge W. Brian Gaddy determined Plaintiffs’ claim under Section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) was barred by the applicable statute of limitations as “physical on-site construction of the remedial action” occurred more than six years prior to when Plaintiffs brought their lawsuit. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that costs related to a leachate collection system constructed approximately a year before the adoption of a Record of Decision (“ROD”) amendment outlining a permanent remedy for the Orongo-Duenweg Mining Belt Superfund Site (the “Site”) was the beginning of the six-year limitations period. In doing so, the Court rejected adoption of a “bright-line” rule that remedial actions begun before adoption of a final remedial plan do not trigger the limitations period. Read More »
This entry was authored by MGKF Summer Associate Karina Zakarian
On June 25, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a case of first impression, vacated the United States District Court for the District of Maryland’s holding in 68th Street Site Work Group v. Alban Tractor Company et al., No. 23-1155 (4th Cir. Jun. 25, 2024), that arranger liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) requires a potentially responsible party to have knowledge that the waste it discards is hazardous. Rather, the Fourth Circuit found that the mere intent to dispose of waste suffices to establish liability under CERCLA. According to the Court, imposing scienter on arrangers of waste disposal would contradict both legislative intent and the strict liability scheme governing superfund site remediation. Read More »
Last month we reported on Curtis v. 7-Eleven, in which the Northern District of Illinois held that marking products as “recyclable” when they may not, as a practical matter, be recycled did not constitute consumer fraud because the fact that the material is capable of being recycled is not false or misleading. This month, the Northern District of California came to the same conclusion. In David Swartz, et al., v. The Coca-Cola Company, et al., No. 21-cv-04643 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2022), the Honorable James Donato of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a motion to dismiss claims brought against defendants Coca-Cola, Blue Triton Brands, and Niagara Bottling (collectively the “Defendants”) by plaintiff individuals and Sierra Club (“Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants alleging violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, False Advertising Law, and Unfair Competition Law, and that such violations constitute fraud, deceit, and/or misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the “100% recyclable” labels on single-use plastic bottles supplied by the Defendants were false and misleading because most plastic bottles are not recycled and instead end up in landfills or incinerators due to a lack of recycling capacity and a lack of demand for recycled plastics. Read More »
In Curtis v. 7-Eleven, No. 21-cv-6079, 2022 WL 4182384, at * 1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2022), the Honorable Steven C. Seeger of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois delivered an eminently readable and entertaining decision, granting in part and dismissing in part 7-Eleven’s motion to dismiss a number of “greenwashing” claims brought against it by putative class representative, Devon Curtis. Greenwashing is defined as “the act or practice of making a product, policy, activity, etc. appear to be more environmentally friendly or less environmentally damaging than it really is.” In her complaint, Curtis alleges that she purchased foam plates, foam cups, party cups, and freezer bags from 7-Eleven. Even though these products were labeled “recyclable”, Curtis alleges that they never really were, either because very few recycling facilities accept these products or because some of the products lacked markings, known as RIC numbers, which recycling facilities use to sort products by plastic type. Read More »
In order to bring a citizen suit in federal district court under the Clean Water Act, 33 USC § 1365(a)(1), the plaintiff must first give “notice of the alleged violation” to the alleged violator, the EPA, and the State at least 60 days prior to commencing suit. In Shark River Cleanup Coalition v. Township of Wall; Estate of Fred McDowell Jr., (No. 21-2060, 3d Cir. August 24, 2022), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in its finding that the notice was inadequate because it had not adequately identified the location of the alleged violation as required by the EPA regulations implementing the statutory notice requirement, but upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit on an alternate ground not reached by the district court – that the notice that was given was inadequate because it did not provide “sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated” also as required by EPA’s regulations. 40 C.F.R. §135.3(a). Read More »
A successful defense of a mass environmental tort case frequently turns on class certification. In Holly Lloyd v. Covanta Plymouth Renewable Energy, LLC, No. 20-4330, 2022 WL 407377 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2022), a federal district court denied a motion to certify a class of neighboring residents complaining about noxious odors from a municipal waste incinerator. In so holding, the court’s decision set out key strategies and considerations for defeating class certification in future mass environmental tort cases. Read More »
On December 2, 2021, addressing issues related to the definition of “disposal” and compliance with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) in a claim brought under Section 107 of CERCLA, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied both Plaintiff Stanford University’s (“Stanford”) motion for summary judgment and Defendant Agilent Technologies, Inc.’s (“Agilent”) cross motion for summary judgment. See Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., Slip Op. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2021). The Court denied Stanford’s motion because there was a genuine dispute about whether HP spread PCB contaminated soil over uncontaminated areas of Stanford’s property and Stanford failed to show that it incurred costs consistent with the NCP. Id. The court denied HP’s cross motion because, although incurred in connection with redevelopment of the property, Stanford’s clean-up costs were “necessary” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) and, separately, because a genuine dispute existed as to whether Stanford consented to the disposal of hazardous material on its property. Id. Read More »
When a homeowner misses trash day for months, piling up stinking bags of trash in the backyard, neighboring homeowners could presumably bring a private nuisance claim against that homeowner to abate the nuisance. But what if that neighbor was a landfill and its noxious odors spread for miles: who in the surrounding neighborhood would have standing to abate that apparent nuisance? The answer depends on the jurisdiction. In the recent decision Davies v. S.A. Dunn & Co., Nos. 530994/531613 (3d Dep’t Oct. 21, 2021), a split panel in the Appellate Division for the Third Judicial Department in New York dismissed public nuisance and negligence claims brought by neighboring residents against a landfill for failing to control its odor emissions because the plaintiffs failed to allege that they had suffered a “special injury” that was distinct from other residents in the area. Assuming it withstands any appeal, the decision is a significant check on public nuisance claims in New York. Read More »
This Blog Post was authored by Isaiah B. Kramer, a summer associate.
On June 7, 2021, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in part a decision of the Appellate Division and held that the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (“the Department”) may bring an enforcement action against a county under the State’s Solid Wastes Disposal Sites and and Facilities Act (“the SWA”). Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of La Plata v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 2021 CO 43. In doing so, the Court found that the county was neither protected by sovereign immunity nor otherwise exempt from the reach of the SWA. Read More »
Less than a month after hearing oral arguments, the United States Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Guam v. United States, Docket No. 20-382 (May 24, 2021), the eagerly anticipated opinion on whether consent decrees and administrative orders that do not expressly resolve liability for claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) nevertheless give rise to a claim for contribution under Section 113(f)(3) of CERCLA. The issue is a crucial one and has been the subject of numerous court opinions because of the short, three-year limitations period for contribution actions. The opinion, which the Court intended to provide clarity in the area, holds that only settlements that release “CERCLA-specific liability” trigger the right to contribution. Read More »